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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff and Appellee, : Case No. 960324-CA 
v. : 
DAVID SHANE MCBRIDE, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals a restitution order (R. 24, 69-71) which followed his 
conviction for unlawful control over a motor vehicle (joyriding), a class A 
misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. §41-la-1311 (1996). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Can a third party's alleged negligence after defendant intentionally took 
a car excuse defendant's criminal liability to pay restitution for the car? This court 
will not disturb a trial court's order of restitution unless the "trial court exceeds the 
authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion." State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 979 
(Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v. Twitchell. 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citations omitted)); accord State v. SnyderT 747 P.2d 417, 422 (Utah 1987). 
2. Is the evidence in support of the restitution order reliable and sufficient 
to satisfy defendant's right to due process? This Court reviews the factual findings 
underlying the trial court's decision under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 
1992)). This Court will find that clear error exists only if the factual findings made by 
the trial court are not adequately supported by the record. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 
935-36 (Utah 1994). However, this Court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law 
based on such facts under a correctness standard, according no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions. Anderson. 910 P.2d at 1229 (citing Eena, 869 P.2d at 936; 
accord State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); State V, Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
782 (Utah 1991)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment V: 
No person shall be . . .deprived or life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . . 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1: 
No State shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . . 
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Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (l)(b) through (e) (1996): 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant 
is convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not 
general damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a 
civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for 
pecuniary damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the 
time of sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a 
governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further 
defined in Subsection (4)(c). 
(e)(1) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(4)(c)(I) and (c)(ii) (1996): 
In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(I) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to 
compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having 
criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal 
sentence at the time of sentencing. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (4)(e) (1996): 
If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution 
of the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant David Shane McBride, aka Michael Scott McBride (g££ R. 11, 12), 
was charged by information with receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle on or 
about April 15, 1995, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-la-
1316(2) (1993) (R. 1-2). Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to 
unlawful control over a motor vehicle (joyriding), a class A misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §41-la-1311 (1993) (R. 10, double-sided). 
Defendant was sentenced to 365 days in jail, with 270 days suspended, and 24 
months probation (R. 12). A restitution hearing was held before Judge Anne M. Stirba 
(R. 44-73; sss. appendix A). After receiving evidence and hearing argument, the trial 
court ordered defendant to pay $600.00 restitution to Mr. Toby Martinez (R. 22-25 
[see appendix B], 69-71). The trial court granted a stipulated motion to extend time 
for filing a notice of appeal (R. 26, 42), and defendant appealed within the time 
extended (R. 31-32). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following are the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order 
(with supporting citations added in brackets) (see. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (4)(d)(I)): 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Prior to January, 1995, Toby Martinez purchased a 1978 Chevy 
Camero [sic]. Mr. Martinez did not register the car nor change the title 
to his name [R. 20-21 (sfi£ appendix C); 50-51, 55-60, 64]. 
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2. On January 29,1995, Martinez sold the car to Wade Maneotis 
for $800.00. Maneotis paid $200.00 down and signed an agreement 
which provided that he would pay the remaining $600.00 by February 6, 
1995. The agreement also provided that the title to the car would remain 
with Martinez until the balance had been paid. After the final payment, 
Martinez would sign over the title to Maneotis. Maneotis was allowed to 
take the car itself [R. 18-19 (see. appendix D); 50-55]. 
3. Maneotis left the car at a[n] auto repair shop and the car was 
stolen from the shop. However, the car was not reported stolen for 
several weeks [R. 2, 54]. 
4. In the meantime, defendant was found driving the car. The car 
was impounded because of registration violations by officers from the Salt 
Lake City Police Department and taken to an impound yard [R. 2, 61]. 
5. The officers misread the vehicle identification number on the 
car so they did not immediately contact either the original owners [sic], 
Toby Martinez, or Wade Maneotis [R. 61]. 
6. Eventually, police detectives followed up on the case and found 
that defendant had been found with the car and that the car had been 
impounded. However, by that time, since the car had not been claimed, 
the impound lot had sold the car [R. 61]. 
7. Wade Maneotis did not pay Toby Martinez the remaining $600. 
Since the car had been sold, Martinez was not able to recover the car or 
his $600.00 [R. 60, 61, 63, 65]. 
8. Defendant was charged with Possession of a Stolen Motor 
Vehicle. On 10/19/95, defendant pleaded guilty to Theft,1 a class A 
misdemeanor before Judge Robert K. Hilder. On 11/21/95, Judge Hilder 
sentenced defendant. The sentence included restitution. Defendant filed a 
motion requesting a restitution hearing [R. 1, 10 (double-sided), 11-16, 
44-73; S££ Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (4)(e)]. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The agreement between Toby Martinez and Wade Maneotis was 
a contract for Maneotis to purchase the car. However, under the 
agreement, title to the car would not pass to Maneotis until the remaining 
1
 Defendant actually pled guilty to unlawful control over a motor vehicle 
(joyriding), a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-1 a-1311 
(1993) (R. 10, double-sided). 
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$600.00 had been paid. Therefore, Toby Martinez had an interest in the 
car that was stolen when the car itself was stolen [R. 18-19, 20-21]. 
2. Toby Martinez could have brought an action to recover his loss 
from Wade Maneotis and others. The fact that he did not collect from 
those others does not limit his ability to collect from defendant. 
3. The actions of the police in misreading the identification 
number of the car and the resulting sale of the car did not eliminate or 
limit defendant's responsibility to pay restitution for the loss caused by his 
actions. 
ORDER 
Having made the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, IT 
IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant pay $600.00 restitution 
which will be paid to Toby Martinez. 
(R. 22-24; see appendix B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Because conversion is an intentional tort and was complete when 
defendant took the car, any subsequent third-party negligence in relation to the 
car has no bearing on defendant's liability for restitution. Defendant's guilty plea 
to unlawful control over a motor vehicle established his civil liability to the owner of 
the car for conversion. Subsequent negligence by a third party is not a defense to 
conversion. Therefore, negligence principles like foreseeability and proximate 
causation are irrelevant. Defendant's guilty plea waived any defenses to his crime, and 
he has not asserted a valid defense to conversion at the restitution hearing or on appeal. 
2. The evidence in support of the restitution order was reliable and 
sufficient, and defendant was accorded due process. The rules of evidence do not 
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apply in a restitution hearing. Nevertheless, direct testimony and reliable documents, 
including the car's title and a bill of sale, established the owner of the car and its value 
at the time of the conversion. Because of defendant's guilty plea, these were the only 
two factual issues in dispute. Defendant had notice of the hearing and an opportunity to 
rebut or challenge the reliability of the evidence presented. There was no violation of 
his right to due process. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
BECAUSE CONVERSION IS AN INTENTIONAL TORT AND WAS 
COMPLETE WHEN DEFENDANT TOOK THE CAR, ANY 
SUBSEQUENT THIRD-PARTY NEGLIGENCE IN RELATION TO 
THE CAR HAS NO BEARING ON DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY 
FOR RESTITUTION 
Defendant argues that "the loss of the [victim's] automobile was proximately 
caused by the negligence of the police in failing to notify the owner prior to impound 
sale" and that he is not liable for restitution because of "this intervening and 
superseding negligence." (Def. Br. at 10). On the contrary, because conversion is an 
intentional tort and was complete when defendant took the car, any subsequent third-
party negligence has no bearing on defendant's liability for restitution. Negligence is 
not a defense to conversion. 
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A. Defendant's guilty plea established his liability for conversion 
As part of a sentence, criminal restitution may be ordered for "all special 
damages . . . which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (l)(c) (1996). Defendant pled guilty to unlawful control 
over a motor vehicle (R. 10, double-sided). In so doing, he admitted his guilt to the 
elements of that offense: exercise of unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, 
without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian, with the intent to temporarily 
deprive the owner or custodian of possession. Utah Code Ann. §41-la-1311(1992). 
Those are the very elements necessary to prove liability in a civil action for conversion. 
See State v. Twitchell. 832 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah App. 1992) (the defendant's guilty 
plea to theft by deception "admitted the very facts and elements necessary to prove 
liability in a civil proceeding for conversion"). 
It is a general rule that any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over the 
personal property of another, in denial of his right or inconsistent therewith, may be 
treated as a conversion of that property.2 18 AmJur2d, "Conversion", §1. Conversion 
is an intentional tort, requiring "'an intent to exercise dominion or control over goods 
2
 Therefore, defendant is liable for conversion even though his guilty plea was 
for an offense that required the intent "to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful 
custodian of possession." Utah Code Ann. §41-la-1311(l)(1996) (emphasis added); sL 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-403 and 404 (1996). 
8 
inconsistent with the owner's rights.'" Alta Indus. Ltd. V. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1290 
n.18 (1993) (giioiing Mired v. Hinkley. 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 
1958)). It is "an act of wilful interference with a chattel, done without lawful 
justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession." 
Mumford v. ITT Com. Fin. Corp.. 858 P.2d 1041, n.5 (Utah App. 1993) (gupiing 
Allied 328 P.2d at 726); see also. Dean Prosser, Law of Torts. §15 at 83 (4th ed. 
1971). Professor Prosser has written: 
The conversion is complete when the defendant takes, detains or disposes 
of the chattel. At that point, it is the traditional view that the plaintiff 
acquires the right to enforce a sale, and recover the full value of the 
property. 
LL at 97. Thus, defendant's conversion of the car was complete when he took the car. 
His guilty plea established bis liability, and the owner of the car could recover damages 
from defendant in a civil action for conversion. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (l)(c) 
(1996); State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 1993) ("Restitution should be 
ordered only in cases where liability is clear as a matter of law and where commission 
of the crime clearly establishes causality of the injury or damages"). 
B. Negligence is no defense to conversion 
Defendant argues that "the loss of the car is solely attributable to the negligence 
of the police" (Def. Br. at 12). He essentially argues that actions or omissions of 
others after his crime should excuse him from responsibility for his crime (see Def. Br. 
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at 15). However, subsequent negligence by others is not a defense to a completed tort 
of conversion. As the Utah Supreme Court has put it simply, quoting Professor 
Prosser, "mere negligence . . . is not a defense to an intentional tort." Berkeley Bank 
v. Meibos. 607 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1980) (quoting Law of Torts. §108 at 716 (4th 3d. 
1971)). This principle of law is well settled. See, e.g.. Kerrigan v. American 
Orthodontics Association. 960 F.2d 43, 45 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Conversion is an 
intentional tort [case cites omitted], and as a rule the victim's contributory negligence is 
no defense to intentional torts, Restatement (2d) of Torts § 481 (1965)"); Cruz v. 
Montoya. 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) ("It would have been improper to have given jury 
instructions on comparative negligence and on the plaintiff's contribution to his own 
injuries in an intentional battery case such as this."); Broussard v. Lovelace. 610 So.2d 
159, 162 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1992) (comparative negligence is not a defense to a 
conversion claim). 
Applying this principle to the facts of this case, defendant's intentional tort of 
conversion was already complete by the time police recovered the car. Sfig Dean 
Prosser, Law of Torts. §15 at 97 (4th ed. 1971). Therefore, acts or omissions after 
defendant's completed crime could not retroactively "supersede" it. Further, any 
negligence in writing down the vehicle identification number could not excuse 
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defendant's already complete intentional (as opposed to negligent) act.3 Defendant's 
discussion of negligence principles like foreseeability and proximate causation is, 
therefore, irrelevant. Indeed, defendant's unconditional guilty plea waived any 
potential defenses. State v. Smith. 833 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Sery. 
758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App. 1988). 
The defenses that may be available to a defendant in a conversion action are 
abandonment, authority of law, consent, unreasonable delay in bringing action, fraud 
by the plaintiff, a lawful interest of defendant to possession of the property, the lack of 
value of the property, the nonexistence or lack of identification of the property, 
unlawful and illegal acts or contracts, or waiver, ratification, or estoppel (18 AmJur2d, 
"Conversion," §§93-104). Defendant has not asserted either at the restitution hearing 
or on appeal that any one of these legitimate defenses applies in his case or absolves 
him from liability. 
In sum, because the owner could recover from defendant the value of the car at 
the time it was taken in a civil action for conversion arising from defendant's criminal 
act (ss£ Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(l)(c) (1996)), and defendant has waived any valid 
3
 Any potential cause of action defendant may have against a third party for sale 
of the impounded car will arise, if at all, only upon his payment of restitution to the 
owner, since defendant will not become its rightful owner until that time. 18 AmJur2d, 
"Conversion," §118 (citing 18 AmJur2d, "Conversion," §180) ("satisfaction of the 
judgment [in a conversion action] operates to transfer the title to the property to the 
defendant as of such time"). 
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defense, the trial court's restitution order did not exceed the authority prescribed by 
law, nor was it an abuse of discretion. Robinson. 860 P.2d at 979; Twitchell. 832 P.2d 
at 868; Snyder. 747 P.2d at 422. 
Point n4 
THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE RESTITUTION ORDER 
WAS SUFFICIENT AND RELIABLE, AND DEFENDANT WAS 
ACCORDED DUE PROCESS 
Defendant argues that the evidence at the restitution hearing was "unreliable" 
and "insufficient" to support the trial court's restitution order, and that, as a result, his 
right to due process was violated (Def. Br. at 16-20). He cites State v. Johnson. 856 
P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993): 
The due process clause in both the United States and Utah Constitutions 
"requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant 
information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence." [Case cites 
omitted] The need for evidentiary reliability in sentencing proceedings is 
greater when specific factual issues must be resolved. 
Defendant's entitlements to notice and a "full hearing" (s££ Utah Code Ann. 
§76-3-20l(4)(e) (1996)), were satisfied in this case, and the information on which the 
trial court's order was based was reliable and sufficient. 
At the outset, and as already noted, defendant's guilty plea to unlawful control 
over a motor vehicle established the very elements necessary to prove his liability in a 
civil action for conversion. See Alta Indus. Ltd.. 846 P.2d at 1290; Robinson. 860 
4
 Defendant's Points II and HI have been consolidated. 
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P.2d at 979; Twitchell. 832 P.2d at 870 (Utah App. 1992). Therefore, the only two 
factual issues remaining to be resolved at his restitution hearing were: (1) the identity of 
the owner of the car defendant took, and (2) the value of the owner's interest in the car 
at the time defendant took it. The State offered sufficient, reliable testimonial and 
documentary evidence in defendant's restitution hearing to establish these two important 
facts. 
A. At issue: identity of car owner, and value of owner's interest in car 
This Court reviews a trial court's factual findings under the clearly erroneous 
standard, and will find clear error only if the findings are not adequately supported by 
the record. Brown. 853 P.2d at 854; £ejia, 869 P.2d at 935-36. The trial court's 
findings as to ownership of the car and the value of the owner's interest are clearly 
supported by the record. 
The title to the car reflecting transfer to the owner was provided to the court by 
the owner's girlfriend (R. 20-21 [s££ appendix C]; 55-57). She also testified that she 
was present when the owner purchased the car, and when he sold it to Wade Maneotis 
(R. 51). She further identified the bill of sale for that transaction, and testified that she 
was eyewitness to the parties' signatures and the transfer of $200.00 from Wade 
Maneotis to the owner (R. 18-19 [s££ appendix Dj; 52-53). Finally, she testified, 
without objection or contradiction, that the owner told her that Wade Maneotis never 
paid the remaining $600.00 for the car (R. 65 [ss§ appendix A]). 
13 
Defendant objected that the title and bill of sale were hearsay, without proper 
foundation, and unreliable (R. 57-59; Def. Br. at 16-20). The trial court overruled the 
objection, citing Utah R. Evid. 1101(b)(3), and noting that the rules of evidence do not 
apply in a restitution hearing (R. 59-60). The trial court's ruling was correct. See. 
State v. Sanwick. 713 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1986) ("The rules of evidence in general, 
and the rules on hearsay exclusion in particular, are inapplicable in sentencing 
proceedings") (citing Utah R. Evid. 1101(b)(3)). As this Court wrote in State v. 
Starnes. 841 P.2d 712, 715 (Utah App. 1992), "Rule 1101 is intended to loosen the 
formality of the [restitution] hearing . . . . If anything, more evidence should be 
allowed under rule 1101, not less." The trial court "must be permitted to consider any 
and all information that reasonably may bear on the proper sentence for the particular 
defendant." Sanwick. 713 P.2d at 708. 
Hearsay is admissible in a restitution hearing as long as the defendant has the 
opportunity to rebut the adverse evidence and to challenge the reliability of the evidence 
presented. State v. Sanwick. 713 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1986) (citing State v. Johnson. 
101 Idaho 581, 618 P.2d 759 (1980)). Since the defendant "had every chance to 
examine fully and controvert any prejudicial information that he claimed played a part 
in the sentencing procedure," the Utah Supreme Court affirmed in Sanwick finding "no 
denial of due process of law." JJL at 709. In defendant's case, the title and bill of sale 
were presented in open court, accompanied by the testimony of a witness who was 
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cross-examined by defendant's trial counsel. Since the accuracy and reliability of the 
information were subject to adversarial testing, defendant was accorded due process. 
Id. The evidence establishing the identity of the owner of the car was reliable and 
sufficient. 
As for the value of the owner's interest in the car, the general rule is that a 
plaintiff in an action for conversion may recover "the value of the property at the time 
of the conversion, since satisfaction of the judgment operates to transfer the title to the 
property to the defendant as of such time." 18 AmJur2d, "Conversion," §118 (citing 
18 AmJur2d, "Conversion," §180); Twitchell. 832 P.2d at 866 ("the measure of 
damages in a conversion case is the full value of the converted property") (citing 
Allied, 328 P.2d at 728). 
The loss to the owner in this case was not his possession of the car, since he had 
already given possession to a purchaser who had made a $200.00 down payment (R. 
18-19, 23 [paragraph 2], 50-55). As seller, the owner held a bill of sale for the 
completion of the purchase (R. 18-19). Consequently, the owner's loss was the value 
he could have received (viz. $600.00) under that bill of sale (R. 23 [paragraph 7]). The 
bill of sale, therefore, establishes the value of the owner's interest in the car at the time 
of its conversion. See Universal C.I.T. Corp. v. Courtesy Motors. Inc.. 333 P.2d 628 
(Utah 1959) ("The sale of a mortgaged motor vehicle, at a time when there is an unpaid 
balance on the mortgage debt, is a conversion of the mortgagee's interest in the 
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vehicle").5 The bill of sale, accompanied by the testimony of an eyewitness to the 
transaction, and testimony that the purchaser had never paid the balance of the purchase 
price, are reliable and sufficient evidence to establish the value of the owner's interest 
in the car defendant took. 
B. Defendant's arguments about other issues and evidence are inaccurate or 
irrelevant 
In support of his reliability and sufficiency arguments, defendant makes 
additional arguments about the state of the evidence that are inaccurate or irrelevant to 
the trial court's findings, conclusions, and order (see. Def. Br. at 16-20). 
1. Title. Defendant cites a repealed statutory provision, and argues that the 
owner did not have clear title to the car to support a claim for restitution (Def. Br. at 
16-17). The statute reads, "Until the division has issued a new certificate of 
registration and certificate of title, delivery of any vehicle required to be registered is 
not made and title has not passed, and the intended transfer is incomplete and not valid 
or effective for any purpose . . . ." (Utah Code Ann. §41-la-707 (1993) (repealed May 
1, 1995) (emphasis added)). While the title presented to the court is signed by the 
previous owner and transfers his interest to the owner (R. 20-21), Mr. Martinez (the 
transferee and new owner) never registered the car or had a new certificate of title 
5
 Defendant would also be liable to the purchaser for his $200.00 down 
payment. But since the purchaser, Mr. Maneotis, did not respond to the State's 
subpoenas in this case, the State did not seek restitution on his behalf (R. 47-48). 
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issued in his name (R. 51, 64). Nevertheless, this provision does not support 
defendant's claim for two reasons. 
First, the bill of sale required transfer of title only upon the purchaser's final 
payment (R. 18-19). Therefore, the statute may have affected the purchaser's interest 
in the car had the transaction been completed. But the transaction was never completed 
before defendant took the car. 
Second, statutory provisions in effect at the time of the transfer to Mr. Martinez, 
and continuing in effect, establish that the car was not "required to be registered." 
(See Utah Code Ann. §41-la-707 (1993) (repealed May 1, 1995)): 
The transferee before operating or permitting the operation of a 
transferred vehicle on a highway shall present to the division the 
certificate of registration and the certificate of title, properly endorsed, 
and shall apply for a new certificate of title and obtain a new registration 
for the transferred vehicle as upon an original registration [with 
exceptions not pertinent here]. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-la-703 (1992) (emphasis added). Mr. Martinez, did not intend to 
drive the car and only had it for a short time before transferring possession to Mr. 
Maneotis (R. 51). The transfer of possession took place at G & G Auto Repair (R. 54; 
see also R. 18), where the car remained until defendant took it (R. 2 [paragraph 1], 23 
[paragraph 3]). Since Mr. Martinez did not drive the car, and it remained at a repair 
shop until defendant took it, the car was not "required to be registered" under the 
17 
statute defendant has cited. Utah Code Ann. §41-la-707 (1993) (repealed May 1, 
1995).6 
Another provision of the statute in effect at the time of the transfer to Mr. 
Martinez, and continuing in effect, provided in pertinent part: 
The new owner of a transferred vehicle . . . may either obtain a 
new registration and certificate of title for the vehicle . . . transferred to 
him or transfer his title or interest in that vehicle . . . to a third party. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-la-705 (1992) (emphasis added). Mr. Martinez agreed to sell the 
car to Mr. Maneotis shortly after he had purchased it himself (R. 51). Under the 
statutory provision just quoted, therefore, Mr. Martinez had the option to obtain a new 
registration and title himself, or to transfer his interest to a third party, who could then 
obtain a new title and registration. That is what Mr. Martinez chose to do. LL The 
title document itself provided for the further transfer or assignment of interest to a third 
party (R. 21, Section B; S£g also. Utah Code Ann. §41-la-705 (1993)). This is the 
block Mr. Martinez would have completed upon transfer of the title to Mr. Maneotis, 
had they completed their transaction. Again, given this statutory option, the car was 
not "required to be registered." Utah Code Ann. §41-la-707 (1993) (repealed May 1, 
1995). 
6
 Ironically, defendant was pulled over by the police because he drove the car 
on a public highway without proper registration or equipment (R. 2 [paragraph 2], 23 
{paragraph 4]). 
18 
2. Proceeds of impound sale. Defendant argues that the "State presented no 
evidence concerning the proceeds of the impound sale" and that defendant "would be 
entitled to an offset for any such funds properly recoverable by" the owner (Def. Br. at 
17, citing Utah Code Ann. §41-la-1104 (1993); 19). Whether defendant is entitled to 
an offset is irrelevant as to his criminal liability for conversion. Likewise, defendant 
misplaces the burden of claiming and establishing entitlement to offset. It is 
defendant's burden. Sfi£ Henderson v. For-Shor Co.. 757 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1988). 
Defendant implicitly argues that he could have returned the car to the owner but 
for police negligence lead;:.. to the impound sale (ss£ Def. Br. at 10-13). However, it 
should be noted tha. icturn of converted property does not bar a suit for conversion, but 
goes merely to reducing the damages Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 
840 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1992) (mug Berrv v. United of Omaha. 719 F.2d 1127, 
1129 (11th Cir. 1983); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 922(1) (1979). Indeed, "the 
general rule is that where an actual conversion of goods has taken place, the owner is 
under no obligation to receive them back upon a tender by the wrongdoer, and the latter 
cannot escape liability for the conversion by his tender." 18 AmJur2d, "Conversion," 
§104. Since he was in the process of selling the car, and had given possession to the 
buyer, the owner was not interested in further possession (see. R. 51), and would likely 
not have accepted a tender of the car by defendant. Nor was he required to do so. 
Defendant could not, in any event, "escape liability for the conversion by his tender." 
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I$L; see also. 18 AmJur2d, "Conversion," §127 ("A wrongdoer cannot, after his 
conversion of property has become complete, lessen the actual damage recoverable by 
tendering back the property. This rule is particularly applicable where the taking is 
wilful. . . ."). 
3. Comparative fault. Defendant argues that the State offered no evidence 
"indicating that the failure of the police to notify the owner was attributable to" 
defendant's conduct, "concerning the proportional fault between" the police, the 
owner, and defendant for the loss of the car, or that the owner "could recover $600 
from [defendant] in a civil action which fully addressed the issues of negligence, 
proximate causation, and comparative fault" (Def. Br. at 18-19). As noted above, 
defendant's criminal conduct constituted the intentional act of conversion making any 
discussion of subsequent negligence irrelevant as to his liability to pay restitution to the 
owner. That a stolen car is later damaged or disposed of by a third party does not 
absolve the thief of liability to the owner, nor is the rightful owner under any duty to 
sue the third party. See 18 AmJur2d , "Conversion," §148; Dean Prosser, Law of 
Torts, §15 at 97 (4th ed. 1971). 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's restitution order should be affirmed. 
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ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
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V 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT. ALL RIGHT. THIS IS THE TIME SET 
3 FOR THE RESTITUTION HEARING. THE COURT (INAUDIBLE) OF MR. 
4 MCBRIDE AND HIS COUNSEL, LISA REMAL. COUNSEL FOR THE STATE IS 
5 PAUL PARKER. 
6 ARE YOU READY TO PROCEED? 
7 MR. PARKERt THE STATE IS READY, YOUR HONOR. 
8 I MS. REMALt WE'RE READY, YES. 
9 THE COURTt VERY WELL. YOU MAY PROCEED. 
10 I MR. PARKERi YOUR HONOR, IF I CAN OUTLINE FOR 
11 THE COURT A LITTLE BIT OF — OF WHERE WE'RE GOING, I THINK 
12 THAT WILL SAVE A LITTLE BIT OF TIME ON THIS. 
13 THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE PLEADED GUILTY TO A 
14 CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR. I BELIEVE IT WAS COUCHED -- COUCHED AS 
15 A THEFT BY VALUE BACK ON THE -- THE 19TH DAY OF OCTOBER '95 
16 ON — IN NOVEMBER 23RD JUDGE HILDER SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO 
17 TIME — TO A TERM IN THE — IN JAIL AS WELL AS, I BELIEVE, 
18 JUST LEFT THE ISSUE OF RESTITUTION OPEN. THIS HEARING WAS 
19 THEREFORE SET AND CONTINUED ONCE. 
20 IT IS THE STATE'S REQUEST IN THIS THAT -- WELL, 
21 IF — IF I MAY TALK ABOUT SOME OF THE FACTS, AND I UNDERSTAND 
22 THAT WE NEED IT PRESENTED BY WITNESSES, BUT PERHAPS AGAIN THIS 
23 WILL BE HELPFUL TO THE COURT. 
24 IN THIS CASE A CAR WAS LEFT AT A -- I BELIEVE IT 
25 WAS A — A CAR REPAIR LOT, AND THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE WAS 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 CONVICTED OF TAKING IT FROM THAT LOT. 
2 THE COURTt WAS IT A CAR OR TRUCK? 
3 MR. PARKER: IT WAS A — 
4 (INAUDIBLE.) 
5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: IT WAS A '78 CAMARO. 
6 MR. PARKERt IT WAS A '78 CAMARO. I THOUGHT IT 
7 WAS A CAR. A --
8 MS. REMALt YOUR HONOR, JUST SO THE RECORD'S 
9 CLEAR, WHAT MR. MCBRIDE PLED GUILTY TO WAS A CLASS "A" JOY 
10 RIDING; NOT A THEFT. IN CASE THAT MAKES ANY DIFFERENCE. . . 
Ill MR. PARKER> AND MY APOLOGIES IF I SAID THAT 
12 WRONG. 
13 BUT ANYWAY, A PERSON BY THE NAME OF WADE MANEOTIS 
14 IS THE PERSON THAT -- WHO COMPLAINED TO THE POLICE AND WAS THE 
15 OWNER OF THE CAR. AND THE INDIVIDUAL BY THE NAME OF TOBY 
16 MARTINEZ HAD SOLD THE CAR TO WADE FOR -- AND IT WAS A CONTRACT 
17 WHICH I HAVE A WITNESS TO TESTIFY ABOUT. IN THAT CONTRACT 
18 BASICALLY WADE WAS GIVEN THE CAR FOR $800. HE PAID $200 OF 
19 IT, BUT OWED $600. TOBY KEPT THE TITLE TO THE CAR AS WELL AS 
20 HAD A LITTLE BILL OF SALE WHICH WE CAN PRESENT TO THE COURT. 
21 NOW, WADE DIDN'T PAY FOR THE CAR. THE CAR WAS 
22 RECOVERED, BUT THERE WAS A MESS-UP ON THE SHERIFF'S DEPART-
23 MENT; SOMETHING INVOLVING SOMEBODY WHO RECORDED THE SERIAL 
24 NUMBER. AND WHEN IT WENT DOWN TO THE IMPOUND LOT THE CAR WAS 
25 NOT TRACKED PROPERLY, SO THE » SO WADE AND — AND TOBY WERE 
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1 NOT CONTACTED. THEREFORE THE CAR SAT THERE AND THE BILLS RAN 
2 UP UNTIL THE CAR WAS SOLD IN AN AUCTION. 
3 SO WHAT WE ARE ASKING FOR AND — AND WADE HAS 
4 NOT RESPONDED TO ANY OF MY SUBPOENAS. THAT WAS ONE OF THE 
5 REASONS FOR THE -- THE BARGAIN IN THIS CASE IS WADE IS SIMPLY 
6 NOT GOING TO COOPERATE IN THE — IN THE PROSECUTION OF THIS 
7 CASE. WHAT WE ARE ASKING FOR IS NOT ANY OF WADE'S DAMAGES, 
8 BUT WE ARE ASKING FOR THE DAMAGES TO TOBY MARTINEZ WHICH IN 
9 ES — IN ESSENCE IS HIS SECURITY INTEREST IN THE CAR. 
10 THE COURTi AND THAT IS HOW MUCH? 
11 MR. PARKERt $600. 
12 THE COURT ALL RIGHT. ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU, 
13 MR. PARKER. 
14 MS. REMfJUi YOUR HONOR, PERHAPS IF WE'RE KIND 
15 OF OUTLINING OUR CASES TO GIVE THE COURT SOME INFORMATION, 
16 PERHAPS I COULD DO THE SAME. I WOULD SUBMIT THAT THE WITNESS 
17 THAT MR. PARKER HAS HERE IS NOT THE PROPER WITNESS TO LAY THE 
18 FOUNDATION FOR THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE THAT MR. 
19 PARKER HAS OUTLINED. 
20 IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT TOBY MARTINEZ IS NOT 
21 PRESENT; THAT A WITNESS WHO HAS IDENTIFIED HERSELF AS HIS 
22 GIRLFRIEND IS PRESENT, AND THAT SHE IS THE PERSON WHO HAS 
23 BROUGHT WITH HER THE — THE VARIOUS DOCUMENTS. AND IT'S MY 
24 POSITION THAT SHE CANNOT LAY THE PROPER FOUNDATION FOR THE 
25 INTRODUCTION OF THOSE DOCUMENTS AND THAT THE DOCUMENTS WOULD 
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1 BE HEARSAY GIVEN THAT SITUATION. 
2 FURTHERMORE, I WOULD SUBMIT THAT EVEN IF THAT'S 
3 NOT A PROBLEM, THAT MR. MCBRIDE, THE DEFENDANT, WOULD NOT BE 
4 RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY RESTITUTION OWING TO MR. MARTINEZ BECAUSE 
5 THAT'S A CONTRACTUAL MATTER BETWEEN MR. MARTINEZ, WHO SOLD THE 
6 CAR, AND MR. MANEOTIS, WHO BOUGHT THE CAR FROM HIM, IN THE 
7 SAME WAY THAT IF I BORROWED MONEY FROM THE BANK TO PURCHASE A 
8 CAR AND THEN I CRASHED THE CAR AND DIDN'T HAVE INSURANCE, I 
9 WOULD STILL OWE THE MONEY TO THE BANK BECAUSE I BORROWED THE 
10 MONEY FROM THEM AND MY CONTRACT IS TO PAY THEM FOR THE CAR. 
11 AND -- AND I WOULD SUBMIT THAT THAT'S THE SAME 
12 SITUATION. IT'S NOT MR. MCBRIDE'S FAULT THAT THERE'S THE 
13 DISPUTE BETWEEN MR. MANEOTIS AND MR. MARTINEZ. THAT'S A PRIOR 
14 CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP THAT I WOULD SUBMIT MR. — MR. 
15 MANEOTIS IS RESPONSIBLE TO MR. MARTINEZ. HE'S THE PERSON THAT 
16 PURCHASED THE CAR AND TOOK POSSESSION OF THE CAR FROM HIM. 
17 THE COURTt I SEE. 
18 ALL RIGHT. 
19 I MR. PARKERt STATE CALLS ELLEN HUNTER. 
20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER« PLEASE STEP FORWARD TO 
21 I BE SWORN IN. 
22 ELLEN HUNTER. 
23 CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE STATE, BEING FIRST 
24 DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKERt PLEASE STEP FORWARD. 
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1 SIT DOWN. 
2 EXAMINATION 
3 BY MR. PARKERt 
4 Q STATE YOUR NAME, IF YOU WILL. 
5 A ELLEN HUNTER. 
6 Q AND WHAT CITY DO YOU LIVE IN, ELLEN? 
7 A SALT LAKE CITY. 
8 0 AND WHO DO YOU LIVE THERE WITH? 
9 A TOBY MARTINEZ. 
10 0 NOW, WHAT IS YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH TOBY 
11 MARTINEZ? 
12 A UM, WELL, WE LIVE TOGETHER THERE. 
13 Q AND HOW LONG HAVE YOU LIVED WITH TOBY MARTINEZ? 
14 A ABOUT 14 MONTHS. 
15 Q ARE YOU MARRIED? 
16 I A NO. 
17 Q DO YOU SHARE EXPENSES AT ALL? 
18 A YES. 
19 Q WHAT TYPE OF EXPENSES DO YOU SHARE WITH HIM? 
20 A RENT, UTILITIES, ALL -- ALMOST EVERYTHING. 
21 Q NOW, HAVE YOU SPOKEN — LET ME OUTLINE THIS. ARE 
22 YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE CAR THAT WAS SOLD TO WADE MANEOTIS AND 
23 THEN WAS STOLEN LATER ON? 
24 A YES. I WAS THERE WHEN THE CAR WAS SOLD AND 
25 STOLEN AND. . . 
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2 
3 
4 
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6 
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8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q 
A 
Q 
OR TOBY 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
LET ME BACK YOU UP. 
OKAY. 
WAS THAT PART OF — THE VEHICLE THAT EITHER YOU 
OWNED WHILE YOU LIVED TOGETHER? (SIC) 
YES. 
AND WHO SPECIFICALLY OWNED IT OUT OF YOU TWO? 
UM, TOBY OWNED IT. 
AND DID BOTH OF YOU USE IT? 
UM, ACTUALLY HE HAD BOUGHTEN (SIC) IT, AND WITH-
OUT A DRIVER'S LICENSE WE DECIDED JUST TO GET RID OF IT SO HE 
WOULDN'T 
NAME OR 
Q 
A 
SO. . . 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
BESIDES 
A 
DRIVE IT AND SO ON. IT WAS NEVER REGISTERED IN HIS 
ANYTHING, SO. . . 
WERE YOU THERE WHEN --
IT BASICALLY -- WE DIDN'T EVEN HAVE IT VERY LONG 
WERE YOU THERE WHEN THE CAR WAS PURCHASED? 
YES. 
AND WERE YOU ALSO THERE WHEN IT WAS SOLD? 
YES. 
AND WHO ELSE WAS PRESENT WHEN THE SALE WAS MADE 
YOURSELF? 
UM, TOBY WAS THERE, AND WADE, AND, UM, I BELIEVE 
IT WAS WADE'S WIFE — OR EX-WIFE — THAT WAS WITH HIM WHEN HE 
CAME AND 
Q 
GOT THE CAR. 
NOW, DID YOU HEAR WHAT WAS SAID CONCERNING THE 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
TRANSACTION 
AND WHO 
A 
SALE. 
0 
FOR THE 
GOT 
SALE 
AND -- AND THAT IS WHO WAS SUPPOSED TO PAY WHAT 
WHAT? 
YES. I WAS THERE WHEN THEY SIGNED THE BILL OF 
NOW, WHAT WAS THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN TOBY AND WADE 
OF THE CAR? 
MS. REMALt OBJECTION; HEARSAY. 
THE COURTi OVERRULED. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKERt UM, WELL, NOT WHAT WAS 
SAID, BUT WHAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THIS WAS. 
HE HAD GIVEN 
KEEP THE 
THE WITNESS. OKAY. LIKE — I UNDERSTOOD THAT 
$200 DOWN. HE COULD TAKE THE CAR AND TOBY WOULD 
PAPERWORK AND THAT, AND HE WAS TO -- I BELIEVE IT WAS 
A WEEK LATER 
Q 
REFERRING TO 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
CAR? 
A 
Q 
-- TO PAY THE REST OF THE $600. 
(BY MR. PARKER) NOW, THE "HE" THAT YOU'RE 
IS WHO? 
OH, WADE MANEOTIS. 
AND HE WAS TO GET THE CAR? 
UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
YOU NEED TO ANSWER OUT LOUD. 
YES. 
AND HE WAS TO PAY HOW MUCH ALL TOGETHER FOR THE 
800. 
AND DID YOU SEE HIM ACTUALLY PAY ANY OF THAT 
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9 
MONEY AT 
A 
Q 
A 
0 
A 
Q 
A 
0 
THE TIME? 
I DID. UM, I WAS — WITNESSED $200. 
AND HE WAS TO PAY THE REMAINING $600 WHEN? 
A WEEK LATER. 
OKAY. 
I BELIEVE IT WAS LAST JANUARY. 
AND WHO WAS TO KEEP THE CAR TITLE? 
TOBY. 
AND DID YOU WITNESS A BILL OF SALE BEING WRITTEN 
AND SIGNED BY TOBY AND WADE? 
A 
EXHIBIT 
YES, I DID. 
MR. PARKER. CAN I HAVE THIS MARKED AS STATE'S 
NO. 1? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKERt (INAUDIBLE.) 
MR. PARKERt AND THIS IS STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 2. 
(STATE'S EXHIBITS 1 AND 2 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 
DEFENSE 
MR. PARKER* IF I CAN SHOW THESE BOTH TO 
COUNSEL. . . 
(INAUDIBLE DISCUSSION.) 
Q 
MARKED -
LOOK AT 
A 
Q 
A 
(BY MR. PARKER) LET ME HAND YOU WHAT IS 
- BEEN MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 1. IF YOU WOULD 
THAT. . . 
UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
WHAT IS THAT? 
THAT'S THE BILL OF SALE THAT WADE GAVE TOBY. 
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10 
Xi 
Q AND DID YOU SEE THAT BEING WRITTEN? 
A UM, NO, I DIDN'T SEE IT BEING WRITTEN. I SAW IT 
SIGNED. 
Q AND IS THAT BILL OF SALE IN THE CONDITION, WHEN 
YOU SAW IT RECEIVED AND SIGNED AT THE COMPLETION OF THAT DEAL, 
AS IT APPEARS TODAY? 
A YES. UM, PARDON ME, EXCEPT FOR THE — DOWN HERE 
THERE'S THE G & G AUTO. THAT'S WHERE THE CAR WAS AT. 
Q AND WHO WROTE --
A (INAUDIBLE.) 
Q AND WHO WROTE THAT THERE? 
A TOBY MARTINEZ WROTE THAT IN. 
Q AND IT'S IN DIFFERENT COLOR INK? 
A YEAH. AND I BELIEVE THIS IS A PHONE NUMBER FROM 
WADE MANEOTIS -- OR AN ADDRESS, AND THAT WAS WRITTEN IN LATER 
TOO. 
MR. PARKERi IF I CAN SHOW THOSE TO DEFENSE 
COUNSEL SO. . . 
THE COURT. YES. 
(INAUDIBLE DISCUSSION.) 
MR. PARKERt AND, YOUR HONOR, JUST SO WE MAKE 
OUR RECORD CLEAR ON THAT, WHAT THE WITNESS HAS POINTED TO ON 
THE DOCUMENT -- AND IT IS IN THE COLOR OF GREEN INK -- THERE 
ARE TWO EXCEPTIONS TO THAT AND ONE IS A PENCILED STATEMENT 
ABOVE THE SIGNATURE LINE THAT SAYSt G & G AUTO REPAIR, 
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1 4735 --
2 THE WITNESS< WEST 
3 MR. PARKERt IS THAT WEST? 
4 THE WITNESS: I THINK. 
5 MR. PARKERt NORTH OR WEST. I CAN'T READ IT. 
6 AND THEN 3500 SOUTH. AND ALSO AN ADDRESS DOWN BELOW WADE 
7 MANEOTIS' SIGNATURE WHICH IS 3065 SOUTH 2855 WEST. 
8 I Q (BY MR. PARKER) LET ME HAND YOU ALSO WHAT HAS 
9 BEEN MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 2. 
10 A UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
11 Q WHAT IS THAT? 
12 A UM, I BELIEVE IT'S THE TITLE TO THE '78 CAMARO. 
13 0 WOULD YOU — 
14 I MS. REMALt YOUR HONOR, I OBJECT TO THE WITNESS 
15 SAYING SHE BELIEVED — 
16 THE WITNESSt I'M SORRY. 
17 MS. REMALt — IF SHE KNOWS WHAT IT IS THEN SHE 
18 CAN RESPOND. IF SHE — 
19 THE WITNESSt I'M SORRY. ALL RIGHT, YES. 
20 MS. REMALi — DOESN'T, THEN IT'S --
21 THE COURT« ASK YOUR QUESTION AGAIN. 
22 0 (BY MR. PARKER) IT — WHAT YOU CAN DO IS — IS 
23 PICK IT UP AND LOOK AT THE FRONT AND THE BACK OF THE DOCUMENT 
24 (INAUDIBLE). 
25 I A ALL RIGHT. 
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1 Q AND DO YOU RECOGNIZE THAT DOCUMENT? 
2 A YES. 
3 Q AND WHAT IS IT? 
4 I A IT'S THE TITLE FOR THE '78 CAMARO THAT WAS SOLD 
5 AND SO — 
6 0 AND HOW DID THAT TITLE GET TO COURT TODAY? 
7 A I BROUGHT IT. 
8 Q AND WHERE DID YOU GET IT FROM? 
9 A UM, OUR HOME THAT I SHARE WITH TOBY. 
10 Q AND DID YOU SEE THAT TITLE AT THE TIME THE CAR 
11 WAS PURCHASED; THIS CAMARO? 
12 A UM, I DON'T BELIEVE I SAW IT THAT DAY. BUT I 
13 MEAN, I -- YOU KNOW, TOBY TOLD ME HE HAD IT. BUT I DON'T 
14 THINK I SAW IT THAT DAY, BUT. . . 
15 Q DID YOU SEE IT AT THE TIME THE CAR WAS SOLD TO 
16 WADE MANEOTIS? 
17 A NO. 
18 Q AND WHEN IS THE FIRST TIME THEN THAT YOU SAW THE 
19 TITLE? 
2C A UM, WHEN THE CAR WAS STOLEN. 
21 0 AND WHERE WAS THE TITLE WHEN YOU SAW IT? 
22 A AT OUR HOUSE, OUR APARTMENT. 
23 0 AND DOES THE DESCRIPTION ON THE TITLE MATCH THE 
24 DESCRIPTION ON THE CAR? 
25 A YES. 
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1 Q AND IS THAT THE PERSON THAT YOU PURCH -- YOU AND 
2 TOBY PURCHASED THE CAR FROM? 
3 A YES. 
4 MR. PARKERi YOUR HONOR, WE'D MOVE FOR THE 
5 ADMISSIONS OF STATE'S EXHIBITS NO. 1 AND 2. 
6 MS. REMAL. YOUR HONOR, I OBJECT. THEY'RE BOTH 
7 HEARSAY. NORMALLY — OR NOT NORMALLY — BUT OFTENTIMES DOCU-
8 MENTS SUCH AS THIS ARE EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE PURSUANT 
9 TO BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTIONS. SO IF YOU HAVE, FOR INSTANCE, 
10 THE CUSTODIAN OF A RECORD TO INDICATE THAT THEY ARE THE 
11 CUSTODIAN AND THEY ARE THE PERSON WHO KEEPS TRACK OF THOSE AND 
12 THAT THEY CAN VERIFY THE — THEM; THAT SORT OF THING, THEN 
13 THEY WOULD NOT BE HEARSAY. 
14 BUT THIS WITNESS IS NOT THE PERSON WHO OWNS THE 
15 VEHICLE. THIS WITNESS WASN'T EVEN PRESENT WHEN ONE OF THEM 
16 WAS APPARENTLY USED DURING THE DAY THAT THE CAR WAS SOLD. AND 
17 I WOULD SUBMIT THAT THE STATE HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY — 
18 PROPERLY AUTHENTICATE THEM. THEY'RE HEARSAY (INAUDIBILE). 
19 THE COURT* ALL RIGHT. EXHIBIT 1 PERTAINS TO 
20 THE BILL OF SALE. YOU'RE NOT ARGUING THAT THAT COULD ONLY 
21 COME IN UNDER THE BUSINESS EXCEPTIONS -- BUSINESS RECORDS 
22 EXCEPTION ARE YOU? 
23 I MS. REMAL: WELL, I — 
24 THE COURTt JUST AS TO EXHIBIT 2? 
25 I MS. REMAL. IT'S HEARSAY BECAUSE THIS WITNESS 
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1 IS NOT PART OF THAT TRANSACTION. 
2 THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND THAT. WITH REGARD TO 
3 THE BILL OF SALE --
4 MS. REMALt UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
5 THE COURT. -- YOUR OBJECTION IS THAT THE 
6 WITNESS WAS NOT PRESENT AT THAT TRANSACTION. 
7 MS. REMALt MY OBJECTION IS THAT IT'S HEARSAY. 
8 THE COURT< OH, ALL RIGHT. 
9 I MS. REMALt THAT IT'S HEARSAY. 
10 THE COURTt AND THE REASON FOR THAT IS THAT THE 
11 WITNESS IS THERE -- A PROPER FOUNDATION FOR AN EXCEPTION HAS 
12 NOT BEEN LAID. 
13 MS. REMALt YES. PERHAPS I DIDN'T EXPLAIN THAT 
14 PROPERLY. 
15 THE COtr*Tt ' AND AS TO EXHIBIT 2 YOU'RE SAYING 
16 THAT IT'S HEARSAY ANL AT THE ONLY EXCEPTION WOULD BE 
17 BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION, 
18 MS. REMALt YE£. AND THAT WE -- THAT'S NOT 
19 BEEN ESTABLISHED — 
20 THE COURTt THANK YOU. 
21 MS. REMALt — IN MY VIEW. 
22 THE COUR?» AND YOUR RESPONSE? 
23 MR. FARtBKi MY RESPONSE INITIALLY IS, YOUR 
24 HONOR, IS ACCORDING TO RULE OF EVIDENCE 1101(B) THE RULES OF 
25 EVIDENCE DO NOT APPLY TO THINGS — MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS 
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1 INCLUDING SENTENCING. I WOULD SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT A 
2 RESTITUTION HEARING TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT AS PART OF THE 
3 SENTENCE IS INDEED A RESTITUTION HEARING, THEREFORE THE 
4 HEARSAY RULE DOES NOT APPLY. 
5 MS. REMALt I'D SUBMIT, YOUR HONOR, THAT THIS 
6 IS A CRITICAL HEARING. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT A — A NUMBER 
7 OF -- OR A FAIRLY LARGE AMOUNT OF MONEY THAT IS AT ISSUE HERE 
8 AND THAT THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE UNDER THE UNITED STATES OF 
9 UT -- UTAH CONSTITUTIONS (SIC) REQUIRE THAT ONLY RELIABLE 
10 EVIDENCE BE USED AND THAT GIVEN THE HEARSAY NATURE OF THESE 
11 DOCUMENTS AND THE LACK OF ANY FURTHER FOUNDATION THAT IT'S NOT 
12 RELIABLE EVIDENCE AND IT OUGHT NOT TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE 
13 COURT. 
14 THE COURTi I SEE. WITH REGARD TO THE OBJEC-
15 TION AND LOOKING AT RULE 1101(B) (3), THAT PROVIDES THE RULES, 
16 OTHER THAN WITH RESPECT TO PRIVILEGES, DO NOT APPLY IN THE 
17 FOLLOWING SITUATION: (3). MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS FOR 
18 EXTRADITION, SENTENCING, OR GRANTING OR REVOCATION OF PROBA-
19 TION, ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS FOR ARREST, CRIMINAL SUMMONSES, AND 
20 SEARCH WARRANTS AND PROCEEDINGS WITH RESPECT -- WITH RESPECT 
21 TO RELEASE OF BAIL OR OTHERWISE. 
22 IF THE RULE ALSO PROVIDES FOR SOME OTHER PROCEED-
23 INGS, INCLUDING GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS, PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 
24 OF FACT, CONTEMPORATE PROCEEDINGS, AND SO FORTH. (SIC) 
25 I IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THIS HEARING WOULD FALL UNDER 
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1 THE CONCEPT OF MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS FOR SENTENCING OR IN 
2 RELATION TO PROBATION BECAUSE IT HAS TO DO WITH -- I DON'T 
3 KNOW WHETHER THE — THE CONTEXT OF THIS IS THAT MR. MCBRIDE 
4 HAS ALREADY BEEN SENTENCED OR — 
5 MS. REMAL: HE HAS BEEN. 
6 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WELL, THEN -- AND HAS 
7 HE — WHAT WAS THE DISPOSITION OF THAT SENTENCE? 
8 I MS. REMALi HE WAS GIVEN ONE YEAR OF JAIL. 
9 THE COURT: UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
10 I MS. REMAL: AND WAS ORDERED — WAS INDICATED 
11 THAT A — RELEASED TO A PROGRAM THAT JUDGE LEWIS MIGHT DETER-
12 MINE TO ALLOW HIM TO GO TO BECAUSE HE'S ON PROBATION WITH HER 
13 AS WELL WOULD BE APPROVED BY JUDGE HILDER, SO. . . 
14 THE COURT: I SEE. WELL, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT 
15 THIS IS OF THE SAME CHARACTER AS THE SENTENCING PROCEEDING AND 
16 IS, IN FACT, AN ESSENTIAL PROCEEDING WITH REGARD TO THAT. AND 
17 ACCORDINGLY, I THINK IT DOES FALL UNDER RULE 1101(B), THERE-
18 FORE, THE OBJECTIONS ARE OVERRULED AND EXHIBITS 1 AND 2 ARE 
19 RECEIVED. 
20 MR. PARKER: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
21 0 (BY MR. PARKER) NOW ELLEN, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, 
22 DID WADE MANEOTIS EVER PAY THAT $600? 
23 I A NO. 
24 Q AND DID YOU EVER GET THE CAR BACK? 
25 A NO. 
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MR. PARKER: YOUR HONOR, AT THIS TIME I WOULD 
LIKE TO SUBMIT — I BELIEVE WE CAN DO IT BY STIPULATION -- A 
LITTLE BIT OF WHAT OCCURRED ABOUT THE CAR — AND I'VE ALREADY 
ALLUDED TO IT — AND THAT IS AFTER IT WAS STOLEN IT WAS 
RECOVERED BY ONE OF THE POLICE AGENCIES -- AND I CANNOT SAY 
WHAT THAT IS OFF THE TOP OF MY HEAD — 
MS. REMAL: I THINK WEST VALLEY. 
MR. PARKERt WEST VALLEY. 
MS. REMALi (INAUDIBLE.) 
MR. PARKER: A POLICE AGENCY WAS GOOD ENOUGH. 
THEY — THEY IMPOUNDED. IT WAS SENT TO THE STATE 
TAX YARD -- OR STATE TAX IMPOUND YARD. SOMEBODY MISWROTE THE 
SERIAL NUMBER; THEREFORE, IT WAS NOT TRACKED PROPERLY. 
NEITHER MR. MANEOTIS, NOR TOBY MARTINEZ, NOR MISS HUNTER WERE 
CONTACTED. THE CAR SAT THERE ACCUMULATING STORAGE AND -- AND 
TOWING BILLS AND THEN IT WAS EVENTUALLY SOLD TO SOMEONE ON 
AUCTION, AND THAT CAR IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE TO EITHER THE 
STATE OR -- OR TOBY MARTINEZ. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, THANK YOU. 
MR. PARKER: WITH THAT I WOULD REST, YOUR 
HONOR. 
THE COURT: YOUR WITNESS. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MS. REMAL: 
Q MISS HUNTER, HOW DO YOU AND MR. MARTINEZ KEEP 
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1 TRACK OF YOUR -- OF YCUR FINANCES? DO YOU HAVE, FCr INSTANCE, 
2 ONE BANK ACCOUNT, ONE CHECKING ACCOUNT THAT YOU BOTH 
3 J CONTRIBUTE TO, OR DO YOU KEEP YOUR FINANCE MORE OR LESS 
4 SEPARATED? 
5 A UM, NEITHER ONE OF US HAVE A CHECKING ACCOUNT OR 
6 A BANKING ACCOUNT. 
7 Q IN TERMS OF, SAY, ANY HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES AND --
8 AND THAT SORT OF THING, JOINT EXPENSES --
9 A UM --
10 Q — HOW DO YOU TAKE CARE OF THOSE EXPENSES? 
11 A WE BOTH -- LIKE HALF. WE BOTH PAY THOSE. 
12 Q AND -- AND ARE TKE?£ EXPENSES THAT EITHER ONE OF 
13 YOU WILL HAVE INDIVIDUALLY THAT YOU TAKE CARE OF BY YOURSELF 
14 WITHOUT DISCUSSION WITH THE OTHER PERSON? 
15 A UM, IT'S USUALLY DISCUSSED BUT, LIKE, I HAVE 
16 BILLS THAT ARE MY OWN --
17 Q UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
18 A -- AND HE DOES HAVE BILLS THAT ARE HIS OWN. 
19 Q AND WITH FINANCIAL MATTERS THAT YOU CONSIDER YOUR 
20 OWN AS OPPOSED TO — 
21 A UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
22 J Q — A JOINT MATTER, DO YOU NECESSARILY DISCUSS 
23 THOSE THINGS, OR SOMETIMES YOU JUST TAKE CARE OF YOUR OWN 
24 FINANCIAL — FINANCIAL MATTERS FIGURING THEY'RE YOUR OWN 
25 BUSINESS AND YOU DON'T NEED TO DISCUSS IT? 
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A UM, NO, WE STILL DISCUSS IT. 
Q YOU INDICATED THAT AS FAR AS YOU KNOW MR. 
MANEOTIS NEVER PAID TOBY THE REMAINING $600; IS THAT--
A RIGHT. 
Q — RIGHT? HOW WOULD YOU KNOW WHETHER OR NOT MR. 
MARTINEZ HAD EVER RECEIVED THAT? DOES HE SHOW YOU, FOR 
INSTANCE, THAT — HIS PAYCHECK WHEN HE GETS IT OR ANY MONEY 
THAT COMES IN? IS THAT (INAUDIBLE). 
A UM, YES, HE DOES. 
Q AND HOW DOES THAT HAPPEN? 
A WELL, IT COMES IN THE MAIL. 
Q UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
A AND SO -- AND I ALWAYS PICK UP THE MAIL. UM --
Q IF HE WERE TO RECEIVE CASH FROM SOMEONE WHO OWED 
HIM MONEY WOULD -- IF YOU DON'T HAVE A CHECKING ACCOUNT — 
A UH-HUH. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
Q -- AND UNLESS HE MENTIONED IT TO YOU --
A UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
Q -- YOU WOULD HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING, WOULD YOU? 
A NO. 
UM, CAN I SAY SOMETHING ELSE THOUGH? 
Q I DON'T HAVE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS IN THAT 
REGARD. 
A OKAY. 
0 NOW, YOU INDICATED THAT YOU HADN'T PREVIOUSLY 
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1 SEEN THE — WELL, LET ME ASK YOU. . . 
2 MS. REMAL: DO YOU HAVE — 
3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: YES, I DO. 
4 I Q (BY MS. REMAL) IN REGARD TO EXHIBIT NO. 2 
5 WHICH IS THE TITLE — 
6 A UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
7 Q -- THE PERSON WHOSE NAME IS ON THE TITLE APPEARS 
8 TO BE CRAIG ALLEN. IS THAT RIGHT? 
9 A RIGHT. 
10 Q AND I THINK YOU INDICATED THAT WHEN TOBY 
11 PURCHASED THE CAR, AS YOU UNDERSTAND IT, BECAUSE HE DIDN'T 
12 HAVE A DRIVER'S LICENSE HE NEVER EVEN BOTHERED TO REGISTER IT. 
13 A RIGHT. 
14 Q HE NEVER BOTHERED TO GET A TITLE ISSUED IN HIS 
15 NAME EITHER? 
16 I A NO. 
17 Q SO THIS CAR THAT YOU'RE DISCUSSING WAS NEVER 
18 REGISTERED TO HIM, NOR DID HE HAVE THE TITLE IN HIS NAME AT 
19 ANY TIME. 
20 A NO. 
21 MS. REMALi I DON'T HAVE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS, 
22 YOUR HONOR. THANK YOU. 
23 THE COURT. ANYTHING ELSE? 
24 
25 *** 
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PARKER. 
Q DID YOU DISCUSS WITH TOBY WHETHER OR NOT WADE HAD 
EVER PAID HIM THE $600? 
A YES. 
Q AND WHAT DID HE SAY? 
A HE TOLD ME "NO". 
MR. PARKER: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS, YOUR HONOR. 
MS. REMALt NOTHING FURTHER. 
THE COURT. ALL RIGHT. YOU MAY STEP DOWN, AND 
THAT CONCLUDES YOUR TESTIMONY. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TESTIMONY. 
THE WITNESS* UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
THE COURT. YOU ARE NOW EXCUSED. 
AND THE STATE HAS RESTED? 
MR. PARKER« THE STATE HAS RESTED, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: MS. REMAL? 
MS. REMAL. YOUR HONOR, I DON'T HAVE ANY 
EVIDENCE TO PRESENT. I DO HAVE SOME ARGUMENT TO MAKE. 
THE COURT. GO AHEAD. WELL, MR. PARKER FIRST. 
I — I THINK I KNOW WHAT YOUR ARGUMENT IS. 
MR. PARKERi OKAY. I COULD JUST SUBMIT IT THEN 
AND RESPOND IF YOU WOULD LIKE, YOUR HONOR. 
MS. REMALt YOUR HONOR, I WOULD SUBMIT THAT AS 
MR. PARKER HAS — HAS OUTLINED, THIS IS A RATHER UNUSUAL CASE 
BECAUSE THERE WERE A NUMBER OF STEPS THAT HAVE OCCURRED 
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1 BETWEEN THE CAR STARTING OUT WITH TOBY MARTINEZ AND ENDING UP 
2 BEING AUCTIONED OFF AT THE IMPOUND LOT. 
3 I WOULD SUBMIT THAT THERE ARE — THERE ARE A 
4 COUPLE OF STEPS IN HERE BETWEEN MR. MARTINEZ AND MR. MCBRIDE'S 
5 CONDUCT THAT WERE COMPLETELY OUT OF THE CONTROL OF MR. MCBRIDE 
6 AND THEREFORE DO NOT CONTRIBUTE TO ANY RESPONSIBILITY ON HIS 
7 PART. THE FIRST THING IS THAT MR. MARTINEZ SOLD THE CAR TO 
8 MR. MANEOTIS. MR. MANEOTIS APPARENTLY MADE A DECISION TO 
9 PLACE IT AT THIS CAR LOT FROM WHICH IT WAS TAKEN. 
10 NONETHELESS, IT'S MY VIEW THAT THE CONTRACT 
11 BETWEEN MR. MARTINEZ AND MR. MANEOTIS STILL EXISTED AND THAT 
12 IT'S MR. MANEOTIS THAT OWES MR. MARTINEZ THAT MONEY BECAUSE IT 
13 WAS A CONTRACT BETWEEN THOSE TWO INDIVIDUALS? AND THAT MR. 
14 MANEOTIS, AS THE PERSON WHO HAD POSSESSION OF THE CAR AND THE 
15 PERSON WHO CHOSE TO PLACE IT AT THE CAR LOT, ULTIMATELY HAD 
16 THAT RESPONSIBILITY AND SHOULD HAVE FRANKLY HAD IT INSURED AND 
17 CHOSE APPARENTLY NOT TO DO SO. BUT THAT DOESN'T CHANGE HIS 
18 CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO MR. MARTINEZ. 
19 I WOULD FURTHER SUBMIT THAT THE — THE UNUSUAL 
20 BUT COMPLICATING FACTOR OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WRITING 
21 DOWN THE WRONG VIN NUMBER AND THEREFORE THE COMMUNICATION 
22 NEVER HAVING BEEN MADE EITHER TO MR. MANEOTIS OR MR. 
23 MARTINEZ -- WHOMEVER IT IS LAW ENFORCEMENT MAY HAVE DETERMINED 
24 WAS THE PERSON ENTITLED TO BE NOTIFIED — WAS NEVER MADE, 
25 AGAIN IS NOT MR. MCBRIDE'S DOING IN ANY WAY. AND IN FACT, HAD 
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1 THAT VIN NUMBER BEEN PROPERLY WRITTEN DOWN, PRESUMABLY THE 
2 OWNER WOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED AND -- AND THE MATTER WOULD 
3 HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY THE CAR BEING RETURNED TO THAT PERSON'S 
4 POSSESSION. 
5 I'M ASSUMING THAT THAT — I'M NOT SURE WHICH 
6 PERSON THEY WOULD HAVE NOTIFIED, BUT HAD THEY NOTIFIED MR. 
7 MANEOTIS HE COULD THEN HAVE CONTINUED TO ATTEMPT TO RESELL THE 
8 CAR, IF THAT WAS WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO DO, OR RETURN THE CAR 
9 TO MR. MAN — MR. MARTINEZ. IF IT WAS MR. MARTINEZ, OBVIOUSLY 
10 HE WOULD HAVE THE VEHICLE BACK. AGAIN, THAT IS ONE OF THOSE 
11 ERRORS THAT'S OCCURRED. BUT, AGAIN, MR. MCBRIDE HAS NO 
12 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT. I WOULD SUBMIT THAT IT'S NOT MR. 
13 MCBRIDE'S RESPONSIBILITY AND THEREFORE HE OUGHT -- OUGHT NOT 
14 TO BE ASSESSED THAT RESTITUTION. 
15 THE COURTJ THANK YOU, MS. REMAL. 
16 MR. PARKER? 
17 MR. PARKERi YOUR HONOR, IT IS A -- A LITTLE 
18 BIT OF AN ODD SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT I WOULD POINT OUT 
19 THAT THERE'S TWO THINGS THAT ARE AT -- AT LEAST WEIGHING 
20 TOWARD THE VICTIMS IN THIS CASE — AND THAT IS MARTINEZ --
21 TOBY MARTINEZ — ONE OF WHICH IS THAT ONE CAN STEAL SOMETHING 
22 AS — I SHOULDN'T SAY ETHEREAL, BUT AS -- SOMETHING LIKE A 
23 SECURITY INTEREST. IN FACT, THERE ARE LAWS AGAINST INTER-
24 FERING OR — OR THE THEFT OF THINGS SIMILAR TO A SECURITY 
25 INTEREST. AND WHEN HE — TOBY SOLD THE CAR TO WADE, HE STILL 
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HAD SOME PROPERTY INTEREST IN THAT CAR THAT THE VICTIM STOLE 
AS HE DID THE PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE CAR ITSELF. 
SECOND, IN THIS CASE TOBY KEPT THE ACTUAL TITLE 
WHICH IS, IN THE STATE OF UTAH, PROOF OF OWNERSHIP OF THE CAR. 
IT IS SIGNED ON THE BACK. IT IS — IT IS THE DOCUMENT THAT — 
THAT AUTHENTICATES OR INDICATES ONE OWNS A CAR. HE ACTUALLY 
KEPT IT. SO WHATEVER THE CONTRACT WAS, I DON'T KNOW THAT ONE 
CAN SAY THAT WADE OWNED THE CAR ALTOGETHER. HE PROBABLY HAD 
POSSESSORY INTEREST IN THE CAR, BUT MARTINEZ STILL HAD SOME 
PROPERTY INTEREST THERE. 
I WOULD SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT THE REAL ISSUE 
HERE IS -- IS THE ACTION OF THE POLICE OFFICER. AND WHAT I 
MEAN BY THAT IS -- IS THERE WAS SOME PROPERTY INTEREST OR SOME 
INTEREST BY THE -- BY TOBY MARTINEZ IN THIS CAR. DOES WHAT 
THE ARE — OR DOES WHAT THE OFFICERS DID BY FAILING TO RECORD 
THE SERIAL NUMBER CORRECTLY AND THEREFORE SETTING INTO MOTION 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT — THAT ENDED UP WITH THE AUCTION OF 
THE CAR, DOES THAT ELIMINATE THE DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIBILITY? 
AND TO ME IT DOES NOT. IT IS THE DEFENDANT THAT STOLE THE 
CAR. 
REGARDLESS OF ANYONE'S CONTRACT, IT WAS THE 
DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL ACT THAT TOOK THAT CAR FROM WHERE IT WAS 
LAWFULLY TO HAVE BEEN — UNDER WADE MANEOTIS' CONTROL AND 
UNDER THE CONTRACT WITH TOBY -- AND TOOK IT INTO — INTO WHERE 
IT HAD TO BE RECOVERED BY THE POLICE AND HAD TO BE IMPOUNDED 
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1 BY THE POLICE. THAT'S THE DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIBILITY. HE SET 
2 IN MOTION THIS WHOLE CIRCUMSTANCE. AND IF SOMEONE ELSE MESSES 
3 UP IN -- IN THAT SERIES OF EVENTS, WHO REALLY IS RESPONSIBLE 
4 FOR THAT? I BELIEVE ONLY THE DEFENDANT. IT IS THE VICTIMS 
5 THAT ARE OUT THEIR MONEY. THE DEFENDANT'S ACTION CAUSED THAT; 
6 PUT THAT CAR IN THAT SITUATION; THEREFORE, I THINK THAT HE IS 
7 RESPONSIBLE FOR IT. 
8 THE COURTi ANYTHING ELSE, MS. REMAL? 
9 MS. REMALt NOTHING FURTHER, YOUR HONOR. 
10 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I — WITH REGARD TO THE 
11 SECOND ISSUE, THAT OF WHAT HAPPENED TO THE CAR BY THE OFFICERS 
12 OR SOMEONE PUTTING DOWN THE WRONG VIN NUMBER AND THEN THE 
13 VEHICLE ULTIMATELY BEING SOLD AT AUCTION, I ACTUALLY HAD 
14 VIRTUALLY AN IDENTICAL CASE COME UP. MR. MOFFAT WAS REPRE-
15 SENTING A DEFENDANT — AND THIS WAS A FEW YEARS AGO -- AND IT 
16 WAS UNUSUAL, AND I PROCESSED THIS ISSUE AT THAT TIME. SO 
17 I'M — I'M NOT UNFAMILIAR WITH IT. 
18 IN ANY EVENT THE -- WITH REGARD TO THAT PARTI-
19 CULAR ISSUE, I BELIEVE IT'S — THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT MR. 
20 MCBRIDE NOT BE RELIEVED OF AN OBLIGATION WITH REGARD TO 
21 PROPERTY THAT ENDED UP BEING DISPOSED OF IN A FASHION THAT 
22 PRESENTED ~ PREVENTED IT FROM BEING RETURNED TO ITS RIGHTFUL 
23 OWNER OR OWNERS, AND THEREFORE THE ACTIONS OF LAW ENFORCE-
24 MENT, IN MY JUDGMENT, DO NOT RELIEVE HIM OF THAT OBLIGATION. 
25 IF -- IN RULING IN THIS FASHION I MAKE NO RULING 
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1 OR DECISION WITH REGARD TO WHETHER IF MR. MCBRIDE FILE A CLAIM 
2 AGAINST THE COUNTY SHERIFF OR CITY POLICE — WHOEVER WAS 
3 RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT -- WHETHER THAT WOULD BE A VALID CLAIM OR 
4 NOT. AND THAT IS A WHOLLY SEPARATE ISSUE AND IT IS NOT BEFORE 
5 ME. BUT AT LEAST INSOFAR AS HIS RESPONSIBILITIES TO ANY 
6 VICTIMS IN THIS CASE, THE ACTIONS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, I THINK, 
7 ARE ESSENTIALLY IRRELEVANT. AND SO I AGREE WITH THE STATE ON 
8 THAT CLAIM. 
9 WITH REGARD TO WHETHER TOBY MARTINEZ IS ENTITLED 
10 TO RECOVER RESTITUTION AND WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A RESTITU-
11 TION ORDER PERTAINING TO HIM, AS I LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE AND 
12 LISTEN TO THE EVIDENCE IT APPEARS THAT THERE ~ THERE WAS A 
13 CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN MR. MARTINEZ AND WADE --
14 MANMARIS? (SIC) 
15 MS. REMALi MANEOTIS. 
16 MR. PARKER: MANEOTIS. 
17 THE COURTt ALL RIGHT. -- AND IN IT TITLE DID 
18 NOT PASS UNDER THEIR CONTRACT, BUT RATHER IT WAS RETAINED 
19 UNTIL PAYMENT IN FULL IS RECEIVED AND THAT TOBY MARTINEZ 
20 RETAINED AN INTEREST, A LEGAL INTEREST IN THE CAR. 
21 SO HAVING SAID THAT, HE IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM A 
22 LOSS AS MUCH AS THE PERSON WHO HAD THE RIGHTFUL POSSESSION OF 
23 THE CAR, AND SO I THINK THAT TOBY MARTINEZ IS IN A POSITION 
24 TO — TO MAKE A CLAIM FOR RESTITUTION. 
25 IF — IT SEEMS THAT IT MAY BE THAT MR. MARTINEZ 
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HAD MORE THAN ONE REMEDY; IN OTHER WORDS, TO CLAIM RESTITUTION 
AND RECEIVE RESTITUTION, OR TO FILE A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT. BUT THE MERE FACT THAT HE MAY HAVE AN ELECTION OF 
REMEDIES DOESN'T ABSOLVE MR. MCBRIDE OF HAVING TO PAY 
RESTITUTION TO SOMEONE WHO HAS A LEGAL INTEREST IN PROPERTY. 
SO, ACCORDINGLY, I THINK THAT RESTITUTION IS APPROPRIATE FROM 
MR. MCBRIDE TO MR. MARTINEZ AND THAT AMOUNT WILL BE $600. 
IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE, COUNSEL? 
MR. PARKERt NO, YOUR HONOR. 
MS. REMALi NOTHING FURTHER. 
THE COURT. ALL RIGHT. I WANT MR. PARKER TO 
PREPARE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS AND AN ORDER CONSISTENT WITH 
THAT RULING. 
THANK YOU, COUNSEL. 
MR. PARKERt THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT. MR. MCBRIDE. 
MR. PARKER. MAY WE HAVE THE STATE'S EXHIBITS 
BACK, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT. YOU MAY. 
IS -- IS THERE ANY OBJECTION, MS. REMAL? 
MS. REMAL. NO. 
THE COURT. THEN — 
MS. REMAL. WELL, ACTUALLY THERE MAY BE, YOUR 
HONOR. WE MAY FILE AN APPEAL OF THIS, IN WHICH CASE THOSE 
NEED TO BE PART OF THE RECORD. 
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7/ 
1 \ MR. PARKER« THEY PROVIDE SOME COPIES OF THOSE 
2 FOR THE FILE INSTEAD OF THE ORIGINALS. 
3 I MS. REMALt THAT WOULD BE FINE. 
4 THE COURT* AS LONG AS THEY'RE LEGIBLE, THAT'S 
5 FINE. 
6 MR. PARKERt (INAUDIBLE) THEM LEGIBLE. 
7 THE COURTt VERY WELL. THAT IS THE ORDER. 
8 COURT'S IN RECESS. 
9 (WHEREUPON THE PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED.) 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
i SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I, VICKI R. BOS, A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER AND 
NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, RESIDING AT SALT 
LAKE CITY, UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I RECEIVED AND 
TRANSCRIBED THE ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED COPY OF THE RESTITU-
TION HEARING IN THE MATTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH VS. DAVID 
SHANE MCBRIDE HELD ON FEBRUARY 1, 1996. 
THAT THE FOREGOING IS A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIP-
TION AS SET FORTH IN THE FOREGOING PAGES NUMBERED FROM 3 TO 
29, INCLUSIVE, EXCEPT WHERE IT IS INDICATED THAT THE TESTIMONY 
OR PROCEEDING WAS INAUDIBLE, AND THAT THIS WAS DONE TO THE 
BEST OF MY ABILITY. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT I AM NOT OF KIN OR OTHERWISE 
ASSOCIATED WITH ANY OF THE PARTIES TO SAID CAUSE OF ACTION, 
AND THAT I AM NOT INTERESTED IN THE EVENT THEREOF. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL AT SALT LAKE CITY, 
UTAH, THIS /M DAY OF MAY, 1996. 
}/J2. if -A^. 
VICKI R. BOS, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES. 
DECEMBER 5TH, 1996 
1 J^2*-*S?\. Ifp^ 
1 w**w 
L M M W M M M 
NOTARY PUBUC 1 
VICKII I .MS I 
2925 E. Evergreen Ave. 1 
San Lake Qty.UT 64109 1 
My Commission Expiree I 
Deoember 5th, 1996 1 
STATE Or UTAH j 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
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Appendix B 
E.NEALGUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County C I I P f ) 
PAUL B. PARKER, Bar No. 5332 • • * • • • # 
Deputy District Attorney MAP 1 i IQQR 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 WM" * l , s y o 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
 Thlrd C| R c 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 SzJt Lake Department 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVID SHANE MCBRIDE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF „, 
LAW, AND ORDER 
Case No. 951014697 /^j? 
Hon. Anne M. Stirba 
On 2/1/96, this matter came before this Court foj^a hearing on State's motion for 
restitution. The State was represented by Paul B-^arker, Deputy P rrict Attorney. The 
defendant was present and represented by Lisa/Kemal, Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association. 
The State presented the testimony of Ellen Hunter. Some evidence was offered by stipulation of 
both parties. Defendant did not present evidence. At the conclusion of the evidence both sides 
argued the matter fully. 
After having received the evidence and after having heard the arguments, this Court 
makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law and order ; 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Prior to January, 1995, Toby Martinez purchased a 1978 Chevy Camero. Mr. 
Martinez did not register the car nor change the title to his name. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 951014697 
Page No. 2 
2. On January 29, 1995, Martinez sold the car to Wade Maneotis for $800.00. 
Maneotis paid $200.00 down and signed an agreement which provided that he would pay the 
remaining $600.00 by February 6, 1995. The agreement also provided that the title to the car 
would remain with Martinez until the balance had been paid. After the final payment, Martinez 
would sign over the title to Maneotis. Maneotis was allowed to take the car itself. 
3. Maneotis left the car at a auto repair shop and the car was stolen from the shop. 
However, the car was not reported stolen for several weeks 
4. In the meantime, defendant was found driving the car. The car was impounded 
because of registration violations by officers from the Salt Lake City Police Department and 
taken to an impound yard. 
5. The officers misread the vehicle identification number on the car so they did not 
immediately contact either the original owners, Toby Martinez, or Wade Maneotis. 
6. Eventually, police detectives followed up on the case and found that defendant 
had been found with the car and that the car had been impounded. However, by that time, since 
the car had not been claimed, the impound lot had sold the car. 
7. Wade Maneotis did not pay Toby Martinez the remaining $600. Since the car had 
been sold, Martinez was not able to recover the car or his $600.00.. 
8. Defendant was charged with Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle. On 10/19/95, 
defendant pleaded guilty to Theft, a class A misdemeanor before Judge Robert K. Hilder. On 
11/21/95, Judge Hilder sentenced defendant. The sentence included restitution. Defendant filed 
a motion requesting a restitution hearing. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 951014697 
Page No. 3 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The agreement between Toby Martinez and Wade Maneotis was a contract for 
Maneotis to purchase the car. However, under the agreement, title to the car would not pass to 
Maneotis until the remaining $600.00 had been paid. Therefore, Toby Martinez had an interest 
in the car that was stolen when the car itself was stolen. 
2. Toby Martinez could have brought an action to recover his loss from Wade 
Maneotis and others. The fact that he did not collect from those others does not limit his ability 
to collect from defendant. 
3. The actions of the police in misreading the identification number of the car and 
the resulting sale of the car did not eliminate or limit defendants responsibility to pay restitution 
for the loss caused by his actions. 
ORPER 
Having made the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, IT IS THEREFORE 
ORDERED that defendant pay $600.00 restitatio'iv^cfr will be paid to Toby Martinez. 
DATED this 11th day of March, 1996^ '°° ' " ' ' ' ' :% \ 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 951014697 
Page No. 4 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the // day of March, 1996 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law, And Order was delivered to: 
LISAREMAL 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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?£HICLE TITLE ««27057l 
DATE ISSUED 12/05/ii*) 
LICENSE 270DFF 
MAILING AOORESS 
ALLEN CRAIG L 
7942 LINTCJ, CH 
w J O I I D A N , UT eaoae 
State Tax Commissk 
Motor Vehicle Divisic 
1095 Motor Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 
VEHICLE CENTfflCATON 
TITLE NOT VALID WITHOUT SECURITY/ILM STRIP OVER THIS AREA 
? m - l C 8 7 l 8 i 5 3 « 8 0 5 
IEA1-78 HAKE-CBEV 
C I l - 6 rOEl-G 
I K 
lidDEjaeia 
:. f#; t^ .^T:iV 
BODY W E - C P 
NAME AND ADDRESS OF VEHICLE OWNER(S) 
**** ALLEK CRAIG L 
A00*688 79*12 LINTCN ER 
CITY.STATE-zipy JORDAN UT 8 U 0 8 8 
NAMEn 
AOORESS 
CITY- STATE -ZIP 
UEN-HOLDER 
NONE 
UEN RELEASE 
SIGNATURE OF UEN - HOLDER RELEASING INTEREST 
DOE 
53328992760 4 3 « 3 
THE MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah, certifies that the perso 
named above has been duly registered in this office as owner of the vehicle described, and that thi 
vehicle is subject to the lien and encumbrance, ff any, herein set forth. 
ft)RMtC.l27 REV 7/89 
«•*« A 020R0S0 
£ZlPtt<??^*K&Z^ 
REGISTERED OWNER T 
Hou must «*gr the NEW OWNER Meton mJkmmt**tna t>*nm*m nmt 
00 NOT SIGN F ODOMETER READING -SCCD0N tS NOT C O M f ^ r T w , 
for • mm tttto upon tht eompfctiem of purchat*. Th» ton, I mg, tfwwn hi 
ft* n*»i»d M a n you m»k* •ppMcrton. " 
-except* 
^fcStfTRANSFER AND ODOMETER DISCLOSURE "' . 
fe«^cjfied herein, I (we) the undersigned owners) hereby transfer^ '•% 
£*s#2, 4nd Interest to the vehicle described on the face hereof-iidl^-S 
' ~ <£ warrant the trfle to be free and clear of aB efxaimbran©es/^r# 
kjentif)edbetow8sNewU©n-Hc*ief,tfany. ~~ 
— J _--^L£S/PURCHASE PRICE 
Tmd^TPwhlole 
N«t Prk>« 
Tmnsfator/^omDttrry Name L 
•i ^ ^ . ^ -•• • • • > ^ " ^ i - - -.--ODOMETER READING 
{Nanislauat be^rintad) 
whowcxrrrentaodressis: 8tmet 
city-- J > * < f r ^ f }& m ULTT zm 
hereby: certify that on-the -date otythls statement, the odometer reads the mi Ueaoe yo7o ua^ ?£, miles (no tenths) _ _ here recorded andihat to the best of my fcnowk belief this reflects the actual mtiqaoe for .this vehicle, unless one of the following Is checked. - ^ W ^ M ^ 
x
 Reflects the amount of mileage in axoess of the odometer mechanical limits. •-;.3.?*s'|v. s" f -51 
-- *«0T the actual rtfteaga tor this vehicle. ^fcRNlNG . ODOMETER CXSCRERWCY. ^ M ^ * f t ^ 
Signaturtoi^ransieror .in ink ,(mu erof  , tt M notarizsd) 
Signature oUJoint Transferor i^ 
Subscribed and sworn to this 
NSWOV^ROMamemutfbe 
-^NAMF'TCfcU f\ 
'ADDRESS. 
. jB^jjjjatoef 
\ %?i&adfe*& 
- / 
"bay of. i 1 0 — i — {BeaFi^S^i^""ifivT"-
©©nature of Notary Public or M.V. Examiner H - ^fet j :<-^ 
NEW UEN-HOLDER (Name i i^byprlntetn 
•JL^2P-fi226L 
Irlrfrwj (NawflKneiJ. 
anriepfts, 
CTTV 
J^EN RELEASE 
' ^ S G y ^ V 
-^-"T'-^^lRT^ TIP 
'Signature of Utnhober Rtlsaalrqlnjyest 
THIe ^ .^Titie 
REASS1GHMEKT OF TlTlf BY TRANSFEROR J OWNER{S)|rRANSFER AND ODOMETER DISCLOSURE ' ?; 
for the ^8/?UTchase price apecfied herein. I (we) the urriersigned ownerts) hereby transfer^ 
convey and assign all rights, tWe, and interest to the vehide described on the face hereof to 
the New Owner named below; artf warrant the txtfe to be free and ctear of aO erxajntorarcesT 
except a Sen in favor of the person kfentrTiedJbelow as New Lien-Hotter, if any. 
•>.-. -tName must bo printed) 
*i*ose current address is: BtreeL. 
SALES/PURCHASE PRICE * 
*t*ml-prtom\ 
-^ -/ 
M Wx . H I P ^ F ^ V E « 0 y 
!S2?K^gF 
Cfty. 
- 2 P - •zgsj^lK miles (no tenths) hereby certify that on the date oh this, etatement, the odometer reads the mileage here recordeo^arx! 1hat to the best of my knowtedfe 
and belief this reflects the actual rrtiaage for this vehicJe, unless one of the foliowtng Is checked' r~:-^L'^2-sl-'" 
'
 A
 Reflects the amount of mOeage in excess of the odometer mechanical limits. 7 ^ % ~ "-'---
Je NOT trie actuaJmlleaga for this vehic^ " "^ "^  
turf of Traneleror in ink (mutt be notarized) L ' . 
^nature of Joint Transferor (mutt Ugnotarized) v 4 
Subscribed and sworn to this _ L _ _ d a y of . 1 0 . 
fJEWOWr^RfNamemi^beorinfeol 
WMF ^ ^ 
v - -^-SeaUJJ2^%A 
Signature of Notary Public or M, V. Examiner;. ^ j ^ g ^ j 
ADDRESS. 
CITY 
X _ ; 
\ T 
NEW UEN-HOIDER fName^  mustiyorihteol:-
ST« -2FL 
I 
Signature of Pivchafer (New Owner) 
ADORES^. 
OTY 
-zjm&m . 2 R -
UTAH CODE ANN. $41-1 -62 REQUIRES THE OWNER TO REMOVE THE UCENSE PLATES UPON THE SAL£ OR DISPOSAL OF A VEHICLE 
-?/ 
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